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The Preservation of Life 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J. 
Father McCormick is on the 
staff of the Center for Bioethics 
at the Kennedy Institute and a 
widely known author in the field 
of medical- moral problems. He is 
a 0 a member of the Editorial 
Advisory Board of the Linacre 
Quarterly. 
Edward G. Ki roy , M.D., has 
devoted his lead editoriaJ! to a 
consideration of the basis on 
which decisions to treat or not to 
treat should be made. My con-
cern here is the conceptual clarity 
concerning what Dr. Kilroy calls 
" three methods of ethical analy-
sis available." It seems to me that 
Dr. Kilroy has only confused the 
matter. 
For purposes of clarity I should 
like to rehearse briefly what he 
regards as the available options. 
First, there is the use of the 
terminology "ordinary" and "ex-
traordinary" means. This ap-
proach, he says, has lost much of 
its usefulness "because of the 
necessity of their application on a 
situational basis." (This wording 
is unfortunate. The application of 
these terms has always been "sit-
uational," sc. relative to time, 
place, availability of medicine, 
care, patient's condition, etc.) 
Secondly, there is a guideline cen-
tered on the potential for human 
relationships. This Dr. Kilroy 
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took from my JAMA article.2 
He sees this as a criterion based 
on the assessment of the individ-
ual's prospective quality of life. 
Dr. Kilroy rejects this-though 
the basis of his rejection is not 
absolutely clear. At one point he 
says such considerations "expose 
the individual and society to a 
perilous path." At another he ar-
gues that the application of such 
a criterion "would require a de-
gree of omniscience quite beyond 
the limits of any known human 
agency." Thirdly, Dr. Kilroy sees 
the proper method as that " re-
stricted to considerations of ther-
apeutic benefit for the patient ." 
More precisely , he words the mat -
ter as follows: "the decision for 
therapy should be based solely on 
whether this form of medical 
therapy can be expected to re-
store the ill or defective child t o 
that state of health for which the 
therapy was planned." 
I would agree with Dr. Kilroy 
that the terms "ordinary" and 
"extraordinary" are not too help-
ful. They are code terms for other 
judgments. Paul Ramsey has re-
cently pointed out that for all 
practical purposes these terms 
mean " imperative" and "morally 
dispensable." He rightly insists 
that they are, "as classifications, 
incurably circular until filled with 
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concrete or descriptive meaning."J 
We have always known that, I 
believe. But what has happened 
in our time is that t he cruicial 
underlying judgment (what Ram-
sey calls "concrete or descriptive 
meaning" ) is increasingly focused 
on a single element: benefit to the 
patient. 
Dr. Kilroy has stumbled into 
conceptual confusion precisely at 
this point. He attempts to con-
trast "benefit to the patient" 
with a criterion anchored in the 
potential for human relationships 
or experience, as if the two were 
different-the former being non-
perilous, presumably because it 
steers clear of quality-of-life con-
siderations, whereas the latter, 
involving such quality-of-life con-
siderations, must be rejected. I 
wish to show here that this dis-
tinction or contrast will not stand 
up and that those who speak of 
"benefit to the patient" are un-
avoidably involved in quality-of-
life criteria, whether they use the 
word or not. The term "quality of 
life" scares people, largely I sup-
pose because of i ts association 
with a destructive history and its 
possibly abusive interpretations. 
P erhaps we can find a better 
term. But to suggest that "bene-
fit to the patient" is not only a 
better t erm but a different con-
cept because it avoids quality-of-
life considerations is to play the 
ostrich. This needs to be made 
very clear here. And for this rea-
son I shall try to word the matter 
in a variety of ways. 
First of all, let me point out 
that increasingly both ethicists 
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and others are speaking of " bene-
fit to the patient" precisely in 
terms of qua ity-of-life considera-
tions. I tern: moral theologian Sis-
ter Margaret Farley, writing in 
Yale University's occasional jour-
nal Reflection,4 notes that if it is 
proper to consider means more or 
less extraordinary in "relation t o 
t he capacities for fullness of life 
in an individual infant, then it is 
t he case t hat we are basing 
decisions for treatment or non-
treatment on 'quality of life' 
considerations." Farley regards 
this as inevitable "if one stands 
within a t radition that values 
every person and every human 
life, but values physical life in re-
lation to other human values." It 
is obvious that Farley considers 
t his-as do I-to be at the heart 
of t he Catholic tradition on this 
matter. 
Item: the study of a multidis-
ciplinary group published in Pedi-
atrics.' In summarizing its reflec-
t ions the group noted: " Neither 
physicians nor parents are obliged 
to initiate or to continue actions 
which do harm to t he well-being 
of a newborn infant. That well-
being consists generally in a life 
prolonged beyond infancy, with-
out excruciating pain and with 
the potential of participating, in 
at least a minimum degree, in hu-
man experience." The study con-
tinued: "Should it be necessary, 
in t he case of disagreement be-
tween parents and physician, to 
seek legal judgment, whether to 
continue or to terminate care, the 
court should weigh heavily the 
prognosis regarding quality o f life 
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and the injunction 'do not 
harm.''' (Emphasis added) 
Item: a recent article by Nor-
man L. Cantor, professor at Rut-
gers University Schaol of Law." 
Professor Cantor points out that 
in his decision Judge Muir 
equates what is "in -the best in-
terests" of Karen Ann Quinlan 
with "remaining life," no matter 
how dismal that might be. Cantor 
could not accept that and wrote: 
"I can perceive of no benefit to a 
patient from being preserved in a 
totally insensate state, with no 
prospect of ever regaining con-
sciousness. Moreover, the pa-
tient's expressions concerning cri-
teria for a satisfactory or toler-
able existence ought to be shown 
great deference in determining 
that patient's 'best interests.''' 
Increasingly this is the way these 
problems are being discussed. 
Secondly, let me turn to a re-
cept pastoral letter of the German 
bishops to show that "benefit to 
the patient" is a notion inextric-
ably tied to quality-of-life con-
siderations. On June 15, 1975, a 
pastoral letter of the bishops of 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
was read in all the churches. It 
was concerned with euthanasia 
and care for the dying. At one 
point the bishops noted that a 
death worthy of man means that 
"not all medical means are used 
if death is artificially postponed 
by doing so. This is the case, for 
example, when life can, in fact, be 
lengthened by means of medical 
measures, an operation perhaps, 
but when, unfortunately, despite 
the operation, or as a consequence 
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of it, the sick person will suffer 
from severe physical or mental 
disturbances in the period thus 
wrung from death. In this situa-
tion the decision of the sick per-
son not to undergo another 
operation is to be considered 
morally justifiable."i 
The bishops then pose the 
question about the moral duty to 
use indefinitely artificial supports 
such as the respirator. Their an-
swer is extremely interesting and 
will unpack the point I am mak-
ing. They state: "As long as there 
is any possibility of the sick man 
recovering in this way, we will 
have to use all such means. Also, 
it is the duty of the state to en-
sure that even costly apparatus 
and expensive medicines are 
available for those who need 
them. It is quite another matter 
when all hope of recovery is ex-
cluded and the use of particular 
medical techniques would only 
lengthen artificially a perhaps 
painful death." 
"Recovery" - A Complex Term 
Now what is to be noted here 
is the term "recovery." The pos-
sibility of recovery determines, in 
the bishops' statement and, I be-
lieve, in Dr. Kilroy's formulation, 
whether certain life-supports and 
interventions need be used or not. 
If recovery is possible, they 
should be used. However-and 
this is crucial to the point I am 
making-the term "recovery" is 
not quite as simple as it might at 
first seem. "Recovery" can mean 
at least three things: 1) return 
to the state of health enjoyed 
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prior to illness, a full state of 
health; 2) return to a lesser state, 
perhaps one characterized by "se-
vere physical or mental disturb-
ance"; 3) return to spontaneous 
vital functions without conscious-
ness. All of these represent forms 
of recovery in the sense that 
death has been stayed. Now it 
seems clear that if the bishops 
would not deem obligatory (for 
the patient) the medical inter-
ventions that produce the latter 
two categories-a point they ex-
plicity make-then they would 
not include them under the term 
"recovery." This means that "re-
covery" necessarily implies a cer-
tain level of recovery or quality 
of life. For if the means need not 
be used by the patient and the 
reason is that they do not pro-
duce "recovery," then the term 
clearly means not just staving off 
death, but also a certain quality 
of life. What the term "recovery" 
really means, then, in the bishops' 
statement, is sufficient recovery. 
Now that is, I submit, a straight-
forward quality-of-life judgment. 
Our concern, then, should not be 
precisely to avoid quality-of-life 
considerations in decision-making 
-a thing we simply cannot do in 
our times, and never really could 
-but to place such considera-
tions within the value perspec-
tives of the Christian tradition. 
My third and final reflection 
touches on Dr. Kilroy's own sug-
gested criterion, and the language 
he uses to describe it. He argues 
that the decision for therapy 
"should be based solely on wheth-
er this form of medical therapy 
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can be expected to restore the ill 
or defective child to that state of 
health for which the therapy was 
planned." He then applies this 
also to cardiac and neuro-surgical 
patients as follows: "The same 
principle of instituting or discon-
tinuing therapy on the basis of its 
efficacy in achieving the goals for 
which it is planned is applicable 
to decisions regarding therapy for 
severely demaged cardiac or 
neuro-surgical patients when we 
discontinue respirators after it 
has become evident that their 
further use cannot possibly re-
store the patient to health even 
though the patient may have 
varying abilities to fulfill his po-
tential for human relationships." 
And all this is stated as being dif-
ferent from quality-of-life criteria. 
But here Dr. Kilroy must be 
confronted with some hard ques-
tions. There are two key notions 
in his presentatiaon: 1) restora-
tion to a state of health; 2) the 
condition (state of health) or 
goals for which therapy was 
planned. Now what does it mean 
to "restore the patient to health" 
or to restore "to that state of 
health for which the therapy was 
planned"? Obviously, the respira-
tor, for example, has no plans or 
goals where a state of health is 
concerned. It is devised to do a 
certain thing regardless of what 
state of health or ill health the 
patient is in. It is the physician 
who has plans and goals. There-
fore, "that state of health for 
which the therapy was planned" 
is a state of health aimed at or 
planned by the physician using 
97 
t he therapy. Now clearly such a 
"state of health" or the "goals for 
which it is planned" is capable of 
degree-greater or lesser health , 
lesser or more profound ill health. 
Some states of health, I take it, 
would be states so dismal or in-
tolerable that, although therapy 
could be planned to achieve them, 
it need not be used-and precise-
ly because such a state of 
"health" is unacceptable. And the 
reason it need not be used is pre-
cisely that return to that state of 
health or level of survival is con-
sidered unacceptable. That is ex-
actly what the German bshops 
had to imply when they used the 
t erm "recovery" as the controller 
of these decisions. And it is pre-
cisely what Dr. Kilroy must 
wrestle with when he talks about 
" restoration to health" and "goals 
for which the therapy was 
planned." If he does not get in-
volved in such specification, if he 
does not distinguish between 
" restoration to health" and "res-
toration to sufficient health," he 
commits the physician to a form 
of vitalism (keeping life going in-
dependently of its condition or 
potential), that is profoundly at 
odds with Christian perspectives 
on the meaning of life. For any 
condition that staves off death 
will be "health" or "recovery." 
But if he does get involved in 
such specification, he is involved 
with quality-of-life considera-
t ions. 
For instance, let us take a 
child, or an adult for that matter, 
whose life can be saved by surgi-
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cal intervent ion. Let us further 
suppose that that life will con-
tinue for many years after the 
surgery-but it will be a life lived 
in total unconsciousness or in a 
semi-comatose and totally de-
pendent state. It would be agreed 
by everyone, I would hope, that 
no one need undergo such surgery 
if that is the kind of life it will 
save, if that is the kind of health 
it will "restore." The surgery 
could be "planned" for that state 
of health ; but no one need submit 
to such planning, though a person 
is free to do so. Certainly this is 
t he Catholic tradition on this 
matter. 
In summary, t hen, when Dr. 
Kilroy proposes as his decisional 
method "therapeutic benefit for 
the patient," he is not proposing 
something different from quality 
of life considerations. For there is 
always the question of what level 
of benefit to the patient is suffi-
cient to deserve to be called a 
"benefit." "Benefit" like "health" 
is capable of definition along a 
very broad scale. Some "planned 
t herapies" would produce the 
"benefit" of sheer survival; others 
would restore to full or reason-
ably full good health. So when 
Dr. Kilroy uses "benefit to the 
patient" as a decisional criterion 
and then contrasts this with qual-
ity of life criteria, he is using not 
a different criterion, but only dif-
ferent words. Furthermore, just 
as we can hide behind the circular 
phrases "ordinary" and "extra-
ordinary," so we can hide behind 
"benefit to the patient." But the 
notable thing about such lan-
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guage is that we are hiading, that 
is, failing to come to grips with 
the very difficult and delicate re-
flections that alone can flesh out 
the term "benefit" to the point 
where it is more than an empty 
con tainer. If we fail to recognize 
this task and fail to undertake it , 
the notion of "benefit to the pa-
tient" will be left an empty con-
tainer, waiting to be fill ed by the 
perspectives and outlooks of the 
individual physician. Such per-
spectives can be qui te different 
from those of the patient, and can 
at times be highly questionable. 
Therein lies the real danger. 
That brings me to another as-
pect of Dr. Kilroy's formulation 
that is deeply troubling. He says 
that the decision for therapy 
"should be based solely on wheth-
er this form of medical therapy 
can be expected to restore the ill 
or defective child to that state of 
health for which the therapy was 
planned." He applies the same 
criterion to adult patients. Now, 
as noted, it is the physician who 
does the planning of therapy. If 
the sole criterion of whether 
treatment is to be used or not is 
its effectiveness in reaching "the 
state of health for which the ther-
apy was planned," then the deci-
sion to use certain life supports is 
controlled exclusively by the phy-
sician. 
A Reversal of 
Traditional Procedures 
This was the tragic error in 
Judge Robert Muir's decision in 
the Quinlan case. When Judge 
Muir stated that "it is a medical 
decision not a judicial one" and 
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then added that "I am satisfied 
that it may be concurred in by 
the parents but not governed by 
them," he completely reversed 
(probably unintentionally) tradi-
tional procedures. As Professor 
Norman Cantor poin ts out: "This 
b 1 u e p l' i n t for decision-making 
completely reverses normal pro-
cedures. Ordinarily, treatment de-
cisions are made by the patient, 
or by the patient's guardia 
where the patient is incompetent 
. .. This process accords with the 
venerable legal doctrine known as 
informed consen t . Under this 
doctrine, a physician does not 
make treatment decisions and 
then seek the concurrence of a 
patient or guardian."8 It ought to 
be noted that this understanding 
of things is also the official polic 
of the American Medical Associa-
tion. 
I do not believe that Dr. Kilroy 
intended this result of his formu-
lation. But if treatment decisions 
are made solely (as he insists) on 
the "efficacy in achieving the 
goals for which it is planned," I 
do not see how he can avoid a po-
sition identical to that of Judge 
Muir. Not only is that a reversal 
of time-honored procedures ulti-
mately destructive of the notion 
of informed consent, but it puts a 
burden on the physician he should 
be most eager to avoid-the bur-
den of being solely responsible fo . 
therapeutic decisions. His mal-
practice vulnerabilit is already 
brutally burdensome. In short, 
then, the decisions for therapy 
should not be based solely on "its 
efficacy in achieving the goals for 
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which it is planned," as Dr. Kil-
roy says, but it must also take 
account of whether these goals 
are acceptable to the patient, or 
to those charged with his/ her 
care. 
Actually, what I believe Dr. 
Kilroy ought to have pointed out 
to us is the difference between 
decision-making where adults and 
infants are involved. Where 
adults are involved, therapeutic 
and life-sustaining decisions can 
be individualized to the person. 
That is, the notion of "benefit to 
the patient" can be individual-
ized. The adult has a past, per-
spectives on life and its meaning, 
aspirations and achievements. All 
these can be weighed by the pa-
tient in making life-sustaining de-
cisions or by those who know the 
patient best and presumably have 
his best interests at heart. The 
infant is different. The infant has 
no past on which to build; he has 
no known perspectives, value 
judgments, aspirations. He has 
had no life. Thus, the decision 
cannot be individualized to such 
considerations as it can in the 
case of adults. This means two 
things. First, the criteria used in 
determining to save or let die 
where an infant is concerned are 
generalizable to all infants. Sec-
ondly, and as a consequence, the 
criteria used must be the strictest 
possible. That is, the very mini-
mum potential for human experi-
encing or relationships must be 
seen as sufficient warrant for at-
tempting to save. Any other view 
would be a racism of the adult 
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world, and would unjustly de-
prive not simply one but (by logi-
cal generalizability) many infants 
of their chance at life. 
It is our task, and a terribly 
anguishing one, to discover what 
that minimum is. It is in such at-
tempts that we may draw close to 
understanding what "benefit to 
the patient" means. In under-
standing this we shall surely be 
dealing with quality of life con-
siderations-even if we call them 
by a different name. To fudge 
that matter and to continue to 
hide behind the unspecified term 
"benefit to the patient" can be as 
perilous to both patients and doc-
tors as to apply unavoidable qual-
ity-of-life considerations in an 
abusive and wrongful manner. 
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